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Abstract State liability for damage incurred as result of violation of European Union
law is by now a well-established principle of European Union law. It is a principle
still encapsulated in case law, the member states having chosen not to incorporate
it into the primary law of the European Union. The principle has influenced na-
tional rules on the liability for damages and the case-law of national courts. This
article aims to provide an overview of such influence on the Polish law concerning
state liability. This process is visible in Polish law. However as will be indicated,
the influence has been insufficient to guarantee either compliance of Polish legisla-
tion with European Union law or compliance with the principle of the effectiveness
of Union law. This also relates to the case-law of Polish courts, as surprisingly, the
European Union principle of liability for damages has enabled the courts to limit
and restrict the interpretation of Polish law provisions. Yet so far there has been no
case-law enabling the principle to be used to support the approach of Polish law
under which the adoption of rules of liability favorable to the aggrieved party is en-
abled.
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1 The European Union principle of state liability
1.1. The right to obtain compensation for damages incurred as a result of European
Union law violations stems from Union law.1 This means that it has to be guaran-
teed and protected in the national legal system even if national law does not pro-
vide for an equivalent right. Obviously, this right must be implemented through
national law and procedures in accordance with the principle of procedural au-
tonomy.2 However, in so far as the Court of Justice defines the prerequisites for
liability, these have a common content, independent of national law, and they
should be applied in a uniform way by national courts. The introduction into the
national law of prerequisites for liability additional to those formulated by the
Court of Justice, which make obtaining compensation “excessively difficult,”
is unacceptable. It is thus not permitted to substitute the prerequisites set out
by the Court with national ones or to apply, in addition to the European Union
conditions for state liability, domestic ones which do not fulfill the requirement
of effectiveness and equivalence of protection (with the exception of situations
when the state liability in the national law is based on less restrictive conditions).
This is confirmed in the case-law of the European Court of Justice, according to
which
“a right to obtain redress will therefore arise where it has been established
that the rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals
and there is a direct causal link between the sufficiently serious breach of
the obligation relied on and the loss or damage sustained by the injured
party, since those conditions are necessary and sufficient to found a right
for individuals to obtain redress”.3
1.2. However, all issues pertaining to adjudication upon member state liability for
damages, both of a material and procedural character, that have not been decided
in the case-law of the Court of Justice are left to be regulated by national laws.
These laws must of course meet the conditions of non-discrimination (equiva-
lence) and effectiveness.4
2 Basis of state liability in Polish law
2.1 The legal basis for state liability in Polish law is Article 77 of the Constitution
of 1997, which states that “everyone shall have the right to compensation for
any harm done to him/her by any action of an organ of public authority contrary
1Some aspects of this article can be found in Polish language in my work: Póltorak [10]. Polish legal
writing on the European Union state liability principle is extensive, in particular: Górka [3], Pajor [5],
Tokarzewska [15], p. 64; Półtorak [9] and subsequent; Sanetra [12], p. 9; Sanetra [13], p. 7; Sanetra [14];
Sadowski [11], p. 41; Zatorska [17], p. 7; Półtorak [6], p. 941–979; Półtorak [8], p. 462 and subsequent.
2W. van Gerven [15], p. 501–536; Kakouris [4], p. 389–1412.
3Case C-470/03, A.G.M. A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl vs. Suomen valtio and Tarmo Lehtinen [2007] ECR 2749.
4Case C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, [1996] ECR I-102, par. 67.
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to law.” The right to compensation for unlawful action on the part of a state
authority is thus a constitutional rule. However, after the introduction of this new
rule, the detailed provisions of the given status and especially the Civil Code were
still not in compliance with it. In 2001 this was even confirmed in the judgment
of the Constitutional Tribunal, which repealed the basic provision of Civil Code
providing that the proof of the fault of the given authority is required to make
good damage.5
2.2 In 2004, substantial amendments were finally introduced to these provisions of
the Civil Code.6 Currently, the legal basis for state liability in Polish law consists
of the amended provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 417–421). Those rules are
unified now, whereas previously liability for administrative decisions was regu-
lated separately. At present, liability arising out of any state authority’s actions
or omissions is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. 2004 amendments
introduced very clear provisions on liability for administrative, legislative and
judicative actions and omissions. This approach is new as previously liability for
judicial and legislative actions was almost excluded. The amendments also in-
troduced new circumstances governing the State’s liability—the right to redress
arises in the event of unlawful action, damage (including loss), and a direct causal
link between the action and the damage. An additional procedural requirement
was also introduced to the effect that damages are to be claimed only if the un-
lawfulness of an action is stated in the course of appropriate proceedings. That
means that the claim for damages is conditional on a preliminary ruling confirm-
ing that the action in question is against the law. As a rule, a court deciding a
damages claim is not entitled to decide independently, on its own, that the action
was against the law.
2.3 Those amendments introduced to the Civil Code just after the accession of
Poland to the European Union, contained no reference to European Union law.
Nor did the statement of reasons for those amendments. However, there is no
doubt that they were partly inspired by European Union law and by the case-law
of the European Court of Justice. Not referring to the European Union principle
of state liability seems to be a rule in the legislative process. In the legislative
work on the changes into Polish provisions pertaining to liability, this princi-
ple seems absent. In the explanatory statement for the basic amendments to the
Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not even mentioned once. In
the explanatory statement regarding the 2010 amendments to the provisions of
the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure referring to liability for state au-
thorities,7 it was stated explicitly that the matters it regulated were not subject to
European Union law, which may be considered true only if we understand “Eu-
ropean Union law” in a very strict way as excluding the case-law of the European
Court of Justice.
5Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 4 December 2001, SK 18/00.
6Act of 17 June 2004 amending the Civil Code (Journal of Laws, 2004, No. 162, item 1692).
7Act of 22 July 2010 amending the act—Civil Code, the act—Code of Civil Procedure and the act—
Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law (Journal of Laws, 2010, No. 155, item 1037).
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2.4 Taking into account the new provisions on state liability introduced in Poland
in 2004, it seems that the regulation of state liability there is modern, effective,
compliant with the Polish Constitution and inspired by European Union law.
However, if we look into the details of this approach, a number of questions and
doubts arise.
3 Need for specific regulation of state liability?
3.1 In the light of the case-law of the European Court of Justice it is not indispensable
to introduce regulations pertaining directly to liability for European Union law
infringement provided that the national provisions—applied in domestic cases—
are basically compliant with the principles of state liability formulated in Eu-
ropean Union law. Nevertheless, judicial practice is of equal importance—i.e.,
whether domestic courts apply and interpret this domestic regulation in compli-
ance with the Union principles.
3.2 European Union law does not exclude the existence of double standards in na-
tional law—one for compensation claims derived from the infringement of the
national law, and a different one, though uniform and compliant with the Union
standard, for claims derived from the infringement of European Union law. Thus
Polish law may provide for different standards for claims derived from Union
law and from domestic law. However, the Union standard has not been regu-
lated in a holistic way in Polish law, and Union requirements illustrate vividly
all the situations in which Polish law makers attempt to limit or exclude the state
liability.
4 Conditions for state liability and the equivalence and effectiveness principles
4.1 According to the Court of Justice, regardless of the character of the legal infringe-
ment, the following prerequisites for state liability are to be considered: the rule
of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals, the breach must
be sufficiently serious and there must be a direct causal link between the breach
of the law and the damage incurred.8 If we then identify in Polish law some pre-
requisites for state liability that do not comply with those just indicated or some
provisions regulating pursuit of claims which do not meet the requirements of
equivalence and effectiveness, Polish law will not fulfill the obligations imposed
by European Union law. According to the European Court of Justice, European
Union claims for damages cannot be treated less favorably than similar domestic
claims (the principle of equivalence). It is interesting to see if there are or could
be any consequences to the European Union equivalence principle for the Polish
rules on the state liability.
8Case C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, par. 51.
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4.2 First of all, it must be underlined that there are examples in the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court on the application of the European Union principle of equiv-
alence of protection. The Supreme Court stated that ignoring European Union
law in a court judgment may constitute a gross infringement of the law justifying
the declaring of a judgment unlawful on the same basis as this can be done in the
event of the court ignoring Polish law.9
4.3 The liberal standard of liability introduced in Polish law will influence the stan-
dard for Union claims. According to the principle of equivalence, domestic pre-
requisites for liability, which are more favorable for the aggrieved party than
Union prerequisites, should also be applied in adjudicating claims derived from
European Union law (otherwise discrimination against a Union claim, as com-
pared with a domestic one, may occur.) In Polish law, this may pertain to the
prerequisite of unlawfulness. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice,
qualified unlawfulness (sufficiently serious) is a condition for liability whereas
in Polish law mere unlawfulness suffices. This liberal condition should therefore
be applied to Union claims as well. In practice, however, qualified unlawfulness
is understood in European Union law in a similar way to ordinary unlawfulness
in Polish law.
4.4 The principle of equivalence of protection may also have unexpected effects.
As will be explained later, the Supreme Court used the equivalence principle to
justify a restrictive interpretation of the Polish provisions concerning the circum-
stances of liability. It stated that only manifest infringement of law in a court
decision may give rise to the liability in damages.
4.5 The equivalence rule also had similar consequences in the judgments of the Con-
stitutional Tribunal and the Court of Justice referring to Polish legislation incom-
patible with European Union law. This will be explained in point 8.2. below.
4.6 The other problem is the exclusion of liability for non-final decisions and judg-
ments. The provisions of Civil Code do not exclude such liability clearly, but
the prevailing interpretation (including the Constitutional Tribunal10), assumed
that there is no right to obtain compensation for damage or loss resulting from
non-final decisions or judgments. European Union law allows for mitigating or
even excluding liability in the case of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies to
avoid any damage,11 but Polish law excludes such liability as a rule irrespective
of the circumstances. It might happen in case of the decisions or judgments of
the first instance which might be immediately enforced, that the infringement
results from the first instance (non-final) action infringing European Union law.
In such cases, the interpretation approved by the Polish case law might be de-
clared against the state liability rule in European Union law and the principle of
effectiveness.
9The Supreme Court judgment of 8 December 2009, IBU 6/09—the case was about the omission by the
court of Art. 18 of the EC Treaty.
10Judgment of Constitutional Tribunal of 1 April 2008, SK 77/06, OTK 2008, No. 3, item 39.
11Case C-445/06, Danske Slagterier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2009] ECR I-2119, par. 60–62.
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5 The requirement to have an action declared unlawful in an appropriate
preliminary proceeding
5.1 Provisions of the Civil Code make obtaining compensation basically conditional
on having a given action performed by the state declared unlawful in “appropriate
proceedings.” (See Art. 4171 §1 insofar as concerns normative acts; see 4171 §2
insofar as concerns final decisions and final court judgments). That means that
the claim for damages is conditional on the preliminary ruling confirming that
the given action is against the law. The courts deciding a damages claim are, as
a rule, not entitled to decide independently that the action complained of was
against the law.
5.2 If the requirement of having an action declared unlawful constitutes in essence a
prerequisite for liability to pay compensation, it should be assumed that it may
not be applied in the case of claims derived from European Union law as, ac-
cording to the Court of Justice, the circumstances for liability formulated in its
case-law are necessary and sufficient for adjudicating on the question of liabil-
ity.12 If we consider this requirement a condition of a procedural character, which
seems more probable, then for the purpose of the evaluation of its compliance
with European Union law, we should apply the tests of non-discrimination and
effectiveness, which apply in European Union law to procedural limitations im-
posed in the domestic laws of member states which affect the execution of Union
rights.
5.3 It is not clear that the requirement of having a final judgment or decision declared
unlawful in appropriate proceedings is in itself compliant with the requirement
that remedies serving the purpose of pursuing compensation claims should be
effective. In the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice, a national court is
entitled to adjudicate independently whether the prerequisite of unlawfulness has
occurred. No direct conclusion follows from the case-law that it must be the same
court which adjudicates on liability for damages, but such a conclusion may be
derived from the statements on the independence of courts in deciding whether
the circumstances for liability have occurred.13 In Polish law the possibility of
independent qualification was excluded until 2010 and is still very limited. Seri-
ous doubts are raised by this requirement especially in the situation when there
are no appropriate proceedings to have an action declared unlawful, which in fact
blocks the right to obtain compensation.
5.4 Another doubt with reference to European Union law is whether proceedings
before the Court of Justice will be considered appropriate proceedings, within
the meaning of the Civil Code provisions. The Court of Justice of the European
Union may declare a provision of law or “declare a judgment” issued by a Pol-
ish court “unlawful” in the course of these proceedings (something which may
take place under Article 258 of the TFEU,14 or indirectly in preliminary rul-
12Case C-470/03, A.G.M.-COS.MET. Sanetra [12], p. 9 seems to opt for recognizing this requirement as a
prerequisite for liability.
13Case C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, par. 94 et seq.
14Case C-154/08 Commission v. the Kingdom of Spain [2009], ECR I-00187.
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ing proceedings). Such a judgment by the Court of Justice should be considered
equivalent to a judgment of a Polish court declaring a decision unlawful.15
6 Preliminary procedure in the case of liability in respect of court decisions
6.1. The requirement of a preliminary ruling establishing unlawfulness exists irre-
spective of the source of the infringement. In case of administrative decisions
the appropriate proceeding is understood to be extraordinary appeal proceed-
ings from final decisions. In the case of the legislative acts, such proceedings
should take place before courts entitled to declare the provision of law unlawful
(see point 8 below).
6.2. In case of judicial decisions, the appropriate proceeding is considered to con-
sist of extraordinary appeals from the final judgments. As such extraordinary
appeals are very limited, a need existed to introduce a special kind of proce-
dure in which it would be possible to state the unlawfulness of the judgment.
A special proceeding was introduced into the Code of Civil Procedure in 2004,
called a claim for declaring that a final judgment is unlawful (See Articles 4241
to 42412).16 This is a procedure which may be initiated only before the Supreme
Court and only in relation to judgments of the civil courts. It does not lead to
the annulment of the judgment or its being declared invalid. The relevant judg-
ment is still valid and may be enforced, but it is declared to be unlawful. Such a
declaration of unlawfulness may then be used only in the damages claim.
6.3. Important amendments to the above were introduced in 2010. Pursuant to
amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure in 2010, the court adjudicating the
question of liability incurred by a court judgment may in exceptional situations
state independently whether this judgment violates the law.17
6.4. As indicated above, the claim for declaring a judgment unlawful clearly excludes
Supreme Court judgments (Article 4241a of the Code of Civil Procedure). The
lack of an appropriate procedure to declare the judgment of the Supreme Court
unlawful in practice makes the claim for damages against the judgment of that
court impossible. Application of the test of effectiveness leads to the conclu-
sion, and this is also something which follows directly from the judgment in
the Köbler case, that such attempts to exclude liability in respect of Supreme
Court judgments violate the requirements of European Union law.18 It has been
pointed out in legal comments, that since there was no distinct procedure for
15It is worth to note, that the as the appropriate proceeding may be treated the procedure before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in which the Court would declare the infringement of the Convention by the
ordinary courts of even the Supreme Court. However, the case law of the Supreme Court in this respect is
not uniform (see in favor judgment of 28th November 2008 r., V CSK 271/08 and contrary judgment of
15th October 2008 r., I CSK 175/08).
16Act of 22 December 2004 amending the provisions of the act—Civil Procedure Code (Journal of Laws,
2005 No. 13, item 98).
17Act of 22 July 2010 amending the act—Civil Code, the act—Code of Civil Procedure and the act—
Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law (Journal of Laws, 2010, No. 155, item 1037).
18Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239. See: Półtorak [7], p. 175.
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declaring a judgment issued by the Supreme Court unlawful, in order to achieve
compliance with European Union law, a court adjudicating a liability case would
have to declare on its own that there had been a breach of law in the judgment
of the Supreme Court. In consequence, in compliance with the procedure pro-
vided for in Art. 4241 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court would
adjudicate on the unlawfulness of judgments issued by lower courts and at the
same time a lower court hearing a liability case would adjudicate whether the
Supreme Court had infringed the law.19
6.5. The amendments introduced into the Code of Civil Procedure in 2010 may be
seen as having implemented a procedure for pursuing compensation claims for
damages incurred as a result of Supreme Court judgments. Pursuant to these
amendments, a provision was added stipulating that in the case of final judg-
ments against which there is no remedy available, compensation for damages
incurred by final judgments that were unlawful may be claimed in the complain-
ing proceedings, without a prior declaration of the unlawfulness of the judg-
ment. It seems that this provision will also find application in Supreme Court
judgments.20 Such an interpretation, consistent with the wording of the CCP
provisions, would also be a chance for achieving conformity in this respect with
European Union law.
6.6. However, the Code of Civil Procedure still contains provisions which are di-
rectly contrary to the requirements of European Union law. These are provisions
on excluding liability for a court judgment in respect of breaches of law con-
cerning the establishment of facts or the assessment of evidence. Pursuant to
Art. 4244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a complaint for a declaration of un-
lawfulness may not be based on an allegation pertaining to establishing the facts
or assessing the evidence. As may be seen in the judgment of the Court of Jus-
tice in the Traghetti case, the exclusion of liability for damage incurred as a
result of errors in establishing facts or in assessing evidence by a court remains
in obvious conflict with European Union legal standards.21
6.7. References to European Union law rules on state liability are very rare in the
case-law of the Polish courts. It is a paradox that European Union law condi-
tions for state liability were used by the Supreme Court as additional support for
restrictive interpretations of the prerequisites for liability incurred through the
19See: Sanetra [12], p. 9.
20This interpretation is confirmed by the stand taken by the Senate explaining the amendments to the bill
presented by the Lower Chamber, which says: Art. 4241a §1 and 2 pertain to the judgments of higher
courts against which cassation appeals have been filed as well as the Supreme Court judgments—against
which a complaint for declaration of the unlawfulness is not available. The contents of §3 [art. Art. 4241a
§1 and 2] of the article in question, a little enigmatic—in the opinion of the Senate, stipulate that in the
cases when there is no complaint available, compensation may be claimed without a prior declaration
of the unlawfulness of the judgment. It may be concluded on the basis of such formulation of the added
Art. 4241a §3 that it only refers to the judgments issued by the Supreme Court (which are referred to
in §1 and 2), whereas, according to the argumentation provided in the explanatory statement of the bill,
it is a provision of fundamental significance, applicable to all final judgments against which there is no
complaint available, issued on the grounds of the Code of Civil Procedure (as well as the Bankruptcy and
Reorganization Law).
21Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006], ECR I-5177.
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actions of courts. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the mani-
fest character of an infringement of Union law by a national court is a condition
for liability to arise from national courts’ judgments. The manifest infringe-
ment requirement seems to be interpreted by the European Court of Justice in a
similar way to the concept of gross infringement in Polish law and case-law.22
On deciding that an unlawful court judgment which may constitute grounds for
compensation liability consists of a judgment “issued as a result of particularly
gross misinterpretation or misapplication of law, which is self-evident and does
not require an in-depth legal analysis,” the Supreme Court stated that “such un-
derstanding of ’court unlawfulness’ remains consistent with European Court of
Justice case-law, which in the judgment of 30th September 2003 imparted an
even more qualified character to the prerequisite of unlawfulness than in the
case of state liability for damage sustained as a result of legislative unlawful-
ness (C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler vs. Austria).”23 The interpretation given by the
Supreme Court of the provisions of Polish law pertaining to liability for breaches
of law by courts is consistent with the conclusions that derive from European
Court of Justice case-law, and thus does not violate European Union law. Yet
some doubts remain as to the acceptability of this interpretation in the light of
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and of Article 77 of the Con-
stitution, especially given that such interpretation in practice almost excludes
the right to claim damages, as few grounds for declaring a judgment unlawful
are recognized.24 Nevertheless, the notion—put forward in some Supreme Court
judgments—of taking into account the individual and subjective character of ad-
judication and approximating the criteria of liability in respect of the actions of
courts to the concept of guilt,25 goes beyond the notion of the manifest character
of an infringement formulated by the Court of Justice.
7 Different provisions on liability for civil and administrative courts
Polish law provides for separate proceedings before administrative courts, which deal
with cases pertaining to public law. Provisions regulating complaints aimed at declar-
ing a final judgment unlawful were introduced in these proceedings much later than
in the Code of Civil Proceedings. Complaints have been regulated in a similar way
to they are governed under the provisions of the Code of Civil Proceedings, yet with
22See e.g. the judgment of 21 February 2007, I CNP 71/06, LEX No. 282070; judgment of 7 July 2006, I
CNP 33/06, OSNC 2007, issue 2, item 35; for more, see: Bagin´ska [1], p. 184 and subsequent.
23The Supreme Court judgment of 4th January 2007, V CNP 132/06. In the resolution of 7 judges of 17th
December 2009, III PZP 2/09, OSN 2010, No. 7–8, item 97, in turn, the European Union circumstances of
liability for the actions of courts were indicated by the Supreme Court as additional support for the thesis
that interpretational judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal do not constitute grounds for reopening court
proceedings.
24Between 2004 and 2008 almost three thousand claims for declaring a judgment unlawful have been filed
to Supreme Court, only 16 of them has been acknowledged; Bagin´ska [2].
25See the Supreme Court judgment of 7th Feb. 2007, III CNP 53/06, unpublished.
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some important modifications inspired by European Union law.26 A complaint may
be made against the judgments of the lower (voivodship) administrative courts if dam-
age has been suffered in consequence of such judgments. However, Article 285a §3 of
the Law on proceeding before administrative courts stipulates that such a complaint
may not be made against judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court, except in
situations when the unlawfulness results from gross infringement of European Union
law. The complaint thus may not be made against Supreme Administrative Court de-
cisions infringing Polish law, but it is available in the case of decisions infringing
European Union law. The solution makes a distinct reference to the Court of Justice
case-law, which imposes the provision in the national law of liability for damages
incurred by actions of courts, including supreme courts, infringing European Union
law.27 The prerequisite for the complaint provided for in the provisions of the law
on proceeding before administrative courts is gross infringement of European Union
law. This concept should be understood as consistent with Court of Justice case-law—
i.e. with the corresponding concept of the manifest character of a infringement. At
the same time the lawmakers decided that the complaint should not be available in
domestic cases. Thus in practice liability for damages incurred by Supreme Adminis-
trative Court judgments infringing Polish law will be almost fully excluded. From the
point of view of the principles of European Union law, such an approach, discrim-
inating against national claims in comparison with Union ones, is admissible, yet it
remains doubtful whether it is compliant with Art. 77 of the Constitution or with the
provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to liability for unlawful court decisions.
8 Appropriate proceedings in the case of liability for legislative acts
8.1 In the case of damages caused by the issuance of a normative act, the award of
compensation is possible, pursuant to Article 4171 of the Civil Code, only after
the act has been declared, in appropriate proceedings, to infringe the Constitu-
tion, a ratified international treaty or an act of law. This provision was meant
to refer to proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal during the course of
which the Tribunal declares the provision of law to be unconstitutional and thus
null and void with erga omnes effect. However, there can be no doubt that a
suitable precedent in this respect can also be (apart from the proceeding before
the Constitutional Tribunal) a judgment issued in proceedings before the Court
of Justice in which the Court declares in a given case that domestic law is not in
compliance with European Union law. Such a judgment has of course effects dif-
ferent to those of judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal—it does not directly
annul the contested provision of law, but for the purposes of the damages claim
should be treated equivalently. Such an interpretation is all the more necessary
in that the Constitutional Tribunal has refused to adjudicate in cases on the com-
pliance of Polish law with European Union law (stating that this is part of the
26Act of 12th February 2010 amending the act—Law on the organization of administrative courts and the
act—Law on proceedings before administrative courts (Journal of Laws, 2010, No. 36, item 196).
27Case C-224/01 Köbler; Case C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo.
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jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice), so it is difficult to get a precedent
in the form of a Constitutional Tribunal judgment in this respect.28
8.2 The above conclusion also follows from the application of the condition of equiv-
alence leading to the obligation to guarantee the same level of protection to
claims derived from the judgments issued by the Constitutional Tribunal and the
European Court of Justice. In a 2010 judgment, the European Court of Justice
decided a case on the equivalence of compensation claims resulting from a Eu-
ropean Court of Justice judgment and a judgment of the Spanish Constitutional
Tribunal, or more broadly—on the failure of the national law to comply with
the Constitution and with European Union law.29 Compensation claims resulting
from an act of law failing to comply with the Constitution were not subject to a
condition of prior exhaustion of all the remedies against the adverse administra-
tive decision issued pursuant to this act. On the other hand, pursuant to Spanish
Supreme Court case-law, a complaint for compensation for damages incurred by
an infringement of European Union law was conditional on the prior exhaustion
of appropriate remedies, both administrative and judicial. This different treat-
ment of Union and national claims resulted from the differences in available
remedies. The national provision that constituted an infringement of the Consti-
tution was to be presumed constitutional until it was stated that the Constitution
had been infringed by the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal. Neither administra-
tive nor judicial authorities could state this on their own and refuse to implement
the controversial provision. Hence, as the Spanish government argued, the impo-
sition upon the aggrieved party of the obligation to exhaust all available remedies
in such a case, as was demanded by the Spanish government, would be dispropor-
tionate and excessive. It would require first the filing of motions with administra-
tive authorities, subsequently with the court and then waiting for the court to raise
the question of the unconstitutionality of the provision before the Constitutional
Tribunal. The situation is different as regards the incompatibility of domestic law
with European Union law. State authorities and courts are not only entitled but
obliged to do so.30 It is thus reasonable to require that an interested party should
try to assert their rights appropriately before they file a claim for compensation.
Differences in treatment were also justified by the different consequences that
were brought on by the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice, i.e. the fact that a provision may lose its legal validity
as a result of the judgment issued by the Constitutional Tribunal.31 In deciding
the case the European Court of Justice concluded that the claims discussed were
similar. First of all, the subject of both claims was compensation for harmful ac-
tions of the State. As stated by the Court of Justice, the only difference between
the claims was that one was based on a judgment issued by the Constitutional
Tribunal and the other on the judgment issued by the Court of Justice. For the
purposes of considering the condition of equivalence, these claims were therefore
28The Constitutional Tribunal decision of 19th December 2006, P 37/05, OTK 2006, No. 11, item 177.
29Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos [2010], ECR I-00635.
30Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos, par. 15–19.
31Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos, par. 20.
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similar. In delivering this ruling, the European Court of Justice did not accept the
argument to the effect that different consequences arose from European Court
of Justice judgments and the rulings issued by the Constitutional Tribunal. As
for the argument about the authorities’ and courts’ obligations resulting from the
principle of priority and the absence of such obligations and entitlements inso-
far as concerned the constitutionality of legal provisions—the European Court
of Justice did not seem to accept this argument, either. The European Court of
Justice relied first of all on the argument that both claims had the same content,
character and origin. For the European Court of Justice, the last characteristic
seemed to settle the question of the claims’ similarity. It even prevailed over the
argumentation about the easier path of pursuing European Union law claims by
individuals than domestic ones due to the obligations imposed upon state organs
and courts by the principle of supremacy.
8.3 The above ruling indicates that, assuming claims derived from the Polish Consti-
tutional Tribunal case-law and the one of the Court of Justice are similar, rulings
by both courts should offer the same prospects of obtaining compensation for
sustained damages.
9 Conclusion
The new rules on state liability in Polish law draw their inspiration from European
Union rules. Broadly speaking, they seem in compliance with the requirements which
derive from the case-law of the Court of Justice. However, their restrictive interpreta-
tion by the Polish courts in many cases does not permit the enforcement of the claim
for damages in practice. The main problem has been the attempt by the legislator fol-
lowed by case-law to exclude liability in respect of Supreme Court judgments. The
amendments of 2010 in this respect gave however a chance to remedy this incompat-
ibility via the consistent interpretation of Polish law with European Union law. The
other main problem consists of the conditions for liability for court decisions. The
legal provisions themselves do not establish any qualifications for infringements of
law. However Supreme Court case-law, decided with reference to European Court of
Justice jurisprudence, limits declarations of unlawfulness to manifest breaches of law
in court judgments. The application of the manifest infringement condition results in
successful claims being very exceptional. This proves that the right to obtain dam-
ages in the event of the infringement of European Union law by a court decision is
still ineffective.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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